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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
seem strong enough to leave no room for doubt concerning the intention of
the Missouri courts to control disbarment without any interference what-
soever from the legislature.
W. B. M. '38.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION-COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES.
-The application of Lloyd L. Gaines, a St. Louis negro, for admission to
the law school at Missouri University has recently been denied by the Uni-
versity's board of curators.' Gaines is a graduate of Lincoln University,
the state university for negroes, and is the petitioner in the mandamus
suit now pending in Boone County Circuit Court in which the court is asked
to compel the Registrar or the Curators of the University to act, and to
act favorably, on his application for entrance to the law school. Hearing on
this action is scheduled for the April term of court.
Gaines charges in his petition that, since Lincoln University has no law
school, a refusal to admit him to the only law school maintained by the
state solely because of his color is a violation of the equal protection clause
of the Federal Constitution. The curators' answer to this, judging by their
statement to the press, will be that the state legislature has given negroes
substantially equal treatment by providing that "the board of curators of
Lincoln University shall have the authority to arrange for the attendance of
negro residents of the state of Missouri at the university of any -adjacent
state to take any course or to study any subjects provided for at the state
university of Missouri and which are not taught at the Lincoln University
and to pay the reasonable tuition fees of such attendance; provided that
whenever the board of curators deem it advisable they shall have the
power to open any necessary school or department.' 2
Whether this particular method of providing higher education for ne-
groes meets the test of "equal protection of the laws" is an issue which no
state or federal court has as yet passed on. But in Pearson v. Murray3 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has recently handed down a decision in
which the issues were quite similar to those raised in the Gaines case. The
appellee in the Maryland case was a young negro who had graduated from
Amherst in 1934 and had met the standards for admission to the law
school of the University of Maryland in all other respects, but was denied
admission on the sole ground of his color. He was a resident of Baltimore,
where the law school is situated. He brought mandamus against the officers
and governing board of the University of Maryland to compel them to
admit him into the law school. From an order for the issue of the writ the
defendants appealed. In affirming this order the Court's reasoning, for the
most part, followed a long and almost unbroken line of decisions. The
equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution requires the states to
extend to their colored citizens educational facilities substantially equal to
1 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 28.
2 R. S. Mo., 1929, Sec. 9622.
3 (Jan. 15, 1936) 182 Atl. 590.
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those provided for white citizens.4 Though equal educational facilities does
not mean identical educational facilities,5 it does mean equal treatment in
respect to any one facility or opportunity furnished citizens rather than a
balance in state bounty to be struck from the expenditures and provisions
for each race generally. 6 Where the law provides for the separation of the
races in education, separate schools with equal facilities must be main-
tained, and if this is not done, mandamus lies to compel the school authori-
ties to admit otherwise qualified members of the colored races into the
schools maintained for the white race.7
As the Maryland court said, the main question in Pearson V. Murray
was whether Maryland was denying the petitioner substantially equal
treatment in refusing to admit him to the law school of the University of
Maryland. Though this was the only law school maintained by the state,
the legislature had appropriated $10,000 for scholarships of $200 each to
negroes, to give the benefit of college, medical, law, and other professional
courses to the colored youth of the state for whom no such facilities were
available in the state. The court found three reasons why this provision
"falls short of providing for students of the colored race facilities substan-
tially equal to those furnished to the whites in the law school maintained
in Baltimore": (1) "That any one of the many individual applicants
would receive one of the fifty scholarships was obviously far from assured."
(2) The evidence indicated that "going to any law school in the nearest
jurisdiction would involve him (the petitioner) in considerable expense
even with the aid of one of the scholarships should he chance to receive
one." (3) "He could not there (the nearest jurisdiction) have the advan-
tages of study of the law of this state primarily, and of attendance on state
courts where he intends to practice." s The court rejected the idea that the
number of colored students affected by the discrimination was a factor to
be considered, quoting from McCabe v. Atchison, "The essence of the con-
stitutional right is that it is a personal one." 9
Chief Judge Bond, who wrote the opinion, was careful not to commit
the court on any questions not directly raised by the case before it.
"Whether with aid in any amount it is sufficient to send the negroes outside
the state for like education is a question never passed on by the Supreme
Court, and we need not discuss it now."1 o0
4 Claybrook v. Owensboro (1883) 16 Fed. 297; Ward v. Flood (1874)
48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405; Clark v. Maryland Institute (1898) 87 Md.
643, 41 Atl. 126; Piper v. Big Pine School District (1924) 193 Cal. 664,
226 P. 926; Corey v. Carter (1874) 48 Ind. 327.
People v. Gallagher (1883) 93 N. Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232; Corey v.Carter (1874) 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738; Ward v. Flood (1874) 48
Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405; State v. McCann (1871) 21 Ohio St. 198.
, State v. Board of Trustees (1933) 126 Ohio St. 290, 185 N. E. 196;
Wong Him v. Callahan (C. C.) (1902) 119 F. 381.
7 Piper v. Big Pine School District (1924) 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926;
State v. Duffy (1872) 7 Nev. 342, 8 Am. Rep. 713.
(1936) 182 Atl. 590, L. C. 593.
9 McCabe v. Atchison (1914) 235 U. S. 151, 35 S. Ct. 69, 59 L. Ed. 169.
10 (1936) 182 Atl. 590, L. C. 594.
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It is possible that the Missouri Courts will cite the above sentence from
Pearson v. Murray and refuse Gaines' petition for a writ of mandamus to
force his admission into the law school at Missouri University on the ground
of more liberal legislative provisions for negroes in Missouri. The legis-
lative authority given the board of curators of Lincoln University "to pay
the reasonable tuition fees" of negroes sent to the universities of adjacent
states for education not available at Lincoln would appear to permit the
curators to appropriate as much money for tuition fees as they considered
wise. If this authority were exercised, Judge Bond's first reason for holding
inadequate the Maryland provision for colored students would not apply to
the Missouri situation. The Missouri courts would still, however, be con-
fronted with Judge Bond's second and third reasons, viz: the increased
expense which attendance at an outside university would entail despite the
state's payment of tuition fees and the disadvantages of not studying Mis-
souri law primarily and of not being able to attend Missouri courts. These
reasons, however, may not seem substantial to the Missouri judges; and if
they take that view, they may then feel warranted in relying on Lehew v.
Brummel," in which the fact that the petitioner's children had to go three
and a half miles to reach a colored school, while no white child had to go
farther than two miles was held to be no substantial ground for complaint.
A considerable number of other decisions hold that inconvenience in respect
to the place or condition under which educational facilities are provided is
no substantial ground for complaint.12
An alternative remedy of ordering the establishment of a separate law
school for negroes was held not to be available in Pearson v. Murray in the
absence of a legislative declaration of a purpose to establish such a school
or even authority on the part of the state officers to do so. In view of the
Missouri statutory provision that "whenever the board of curators deem it
advisable they shall have the power to open any necessary school or depart-
ment," 3 the Maryland court's reason would lose most of its force in Mis-
souri. Yet it seems most unlikely that in order to avoid admitting one
colored student into the state law school the court would take the drastic
step of ordering the curators of Lincoln University to establish a law
school within the university.
F. F. '38.
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS--PAnT PERFORM-
ANCE OF LAND SALE CONTRACTS.- here services have been rendered as
full consideration for the promise to convey land pursuant to an oral con-
tract when will equity decree specific performance in favor of the party
who has performed? A distinct departure from established Anglo-American
law has been made by the recent Missouri case of Selle v. Selle.1 In this
'1 (1890) 103 Mo. 546, 11 L. R. A. 528, 15 S. W. 765.
12 People v. Gallagher (1883) 93 N. Y. 438; Ward v. Flood (1874) 48
Cal. 36; Dameron v. Bayless (1912) 14 Ariz. 180.
13 R. S. Mo., 1929, s. 9622.
1 (December, 1935) 88 S. W. (2d) 877.
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